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Private-sector indebtedness, measured as the debt to income level, has
grown in recent years and is now at historically high levels. Previous authors
have concluded that indebtedness is an important determinant of the rate
of liquidation among non-financial companies (Wadhwani, 1986; Davis,
1987; Vleighe, 2001). Observing the number of corporate liquidations in
an economy (and insolvent liquidations in particular) is important because
of the significance of the financial health of non-financial firms for other
agents in the economy. Insolvent liquidations, where corporates have not
declared their ability to repay all outstanding debts from the proceeds of
the liquidation process, in sufficiently high numbers could be a cause of
financial instability by forcing banks to write-off bad debts. These
liquidations could also transmit financial distress to other corporates
(similarly through bad debts) and households (by making household
members unemployed). Our analysis shows that the corporate debt to
income level has risen in recent years and that the rate of all liquidations
has begun to rise recently after several years during which the rate halved.
However, the share of insolvent liquidations remains at a low level by
historical comparison, suggesting, albeit with some noteworthy
qualifications, that a link between the recent increase in corporate
indebtedness feeding through to a higher rate of insolvent liquidations is
not apparent.
1. Introduction
Private-sector indebtedness, measured as the debt to income
level, has grown in recent years and is now at historically high
levels (Chart 1). As a result the Irish private-sector debt to income
ratio is relatively high by international comparison with Ireland
now ranked 8
th in terms of indebtedness (Chart 2) in a sample of
29 OECD countries (up from 13
th in 1995). Rising debt to income
levels are common, but not inevitable, during periods of rapid
economic growth. There are examples of relatively fast-growing
economies that have experienced a significantly greater
proportionate increase in GDP by comparison with the increase
in their indebtedness over the same time period (e.g., Mexico
and Finland in Chart 3). This paper presents some descriptive
statistics on corporate indebtedness and liquidations in Ireland in
the context of international evidence which suggests a link
between indebtedness and the rate of liquidations.
* The author is an economist in the Monetary Policy & Financial Stability Department (MPFS).
The views expressed in this paper are the personal responsibility of the author and are not
necessarily held by the CBFSAI or by the ESCB. All remaining errors and omissions are the
author’s. The author would like to thank his colleagues in MPFS and Statistics, participants
at the 2003 Irish Economics Association Conference and the DETE for assistance in
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Previous authors have concluded that indebtedness is an
important determinant of the rate of liquidation among
companies (Wadhwani, 1986; Davis, 1987; Vleighe, 2001). A
higher level of debt finance increases the vulnerability of firms to
adverse income shocks. This is because a higher level of debt
finance imposes obligatory interest and principal repayments on
firms. A common defensive reaction of firms that have suffered
an adverse income shock is to reduce discretionary expenses,
for example, investment, employment, wages and/or dividend
payments (Fazzari et al, 1988; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Bernanke
et al, 1996; Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Benito and Young,
2001). But the obligatory principal and interest payments have
to be met regardless of the state of the firm’s income. Thus, a
relatively highly indebted firm can more easily fail under the
weight of debt service costs that cannot be met out of current
income or cash reserves. It is in this context that Irish corporates
might appear to be more vulnerable now to an adverse shock to
their income because their indebtedness, albeit measured on a
short-time series, has increased somewhat in recent years.
Corporate liquidations in sufficiently high numbers can be a
cause of financial instability by forcing banks to write-off bad
debts. These liquidations also transmit financial distress to other
corporates (similarly through bad debts) and households (by
making household members unemployed). A new generation of
models of banking crises incorporates the effects of weakened
corporate balance sheets (Krugman, 1999). It is for these reasons
that the corporate debt to income level is recommended as a
‘‘financial soundness indicator’’.
1
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the
measurement of indebtedness among Irish corporates. Section 3
presents statistics on the rate of corporate liquidation. Section 4
employs a theoretical model to summarise how increasing
indebtedness increases the probability of liquidation among
firms. Section 5 summarises the other factors, in addition to the
level of indebtedness, that may have a role in determining the
corporate liquidations rate. Section 6 concludes. Our analysis
shows that Irish corporate debt to income levels has risen in
recent years and that an increasing share of this bank debt has
been sourced from resident banks. The data show also that the
rate of corporate liquidations has begun to rise recently after
several years over which time the rate halved. However, the
share of insolvent liquidations, where corporates have not
declared their ability to repay all outstanding debts from the
proceeds of the liquidation process, remain at a low level by
historical comparison. Our analysis suggests, albeit with some
noteworthy qualifications, that a link between the recent increase
in corporate indebtedness feeding through to a higher rate of
insolvent liquidations is not apparent.
1 IMF (2001). A ‘‘financial soundness indicator’’ is any data series where changes in the series
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Chart 1: Irish Private Sector Debt to GDP Ratio
Source: IMF and CBFSAI Calculations.
(a) Debt is proxied by the banking systems' claim on private sector.
(b)
(b) The private sector debt to GDP ratio for the median OECD economy, to be used as a 




















































































































































































































































Chart 2: International Comparisons of Private Sector
Debt to GDP Ratios
Source: IMF and CBFSAI Calculations.



























































































































































































































































Chart 3: The Proportionate Change in the Level of GDP and the






















Source: IMF and CBFSAI Calculations. 
(a) Proportionate changes are in real terms and are calculated between 1995 and 2001.
(b) Denmark has been omitted as an outlier. The debt to GDP ratio increased over 4.5 times
during this period.
2. What has happened to Corporate
Indebtedness?
Irish non-financial companies appear to have become
increasingly indebted in recent years. The debt has been
acquired from three sources: resident monetary financial
institutions (MFIs), non-resident MFIs and the capital markets.
Reliable data are available for the first two sources only (i.e.,
bank-sourced debt).
2 Non-financial corporates had gross loans
outstanding at end-2001 from both resident and non-resident
MFIs
3 of approximately \80.2 billion or 69 per cent of GDP. In
1995
4 these loans totalled \30.6 billion or 58.1 per cent of GDP
(Chart 4).
5 Provisional data for end-2002 suggests the level of the
debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen to 62.6 per cent.
2 The omission of non-bank debt from the calculations may not be very significant in the Irish
case because very few Irish non-financial companies appear to have a credit rating which
is a general prerequisite to access the capital markets.
3 The data on amounts borrowed from non-resident MFIs are sourced from the Bank of
International Settlements (BIS). The BIS produces ‘locational’ statistics on loans outstanding
to the non-bank private sector in Ireland from non-resident MFIs. A non-resident MFI does
not conduct business through a subsidiary or branch physically located in Ireland. The value
of loans granted by these non-resident MFIs are not included in the lending statistics
collected by CBFSAI.
4 1995 is the base year for comparison because the non-resident banking data are available
from 1995.
5 An investigation into the reasons for the increased indebtedness is beyond the scope of this
paper. Volcker (1986) suggests that taxation and interest deductibility of interest payments,
inflation and factors affecting the supply of finance (for example, deregulation in loan
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Chart 4: Total Corporate 
Borrowing (From Resident and
Non-Resident Institutions)
(a)(b)
Source: BIS and CBFSAI Calculations.
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(a) Net loans is gross loans minus deposits.
(a)(b)
(b) Resident MFIs conduct business through a branch
or subsidiary physically located in Ireland.
(b) BIS lending data are in $US and have been 
converted to    with the average exchange rate 
during each period.
However, during this same period non-financial corporates have
maintained substantial deposits with MFIs. Subtracting deposits
from gross loans outstanding gives an estimate of the net position
of the corporate sector vis-a `-vis MFIs. Irish corporates on this net
basis have become less indebted in recent years. These
calculations show that net loans outstanding from all MFIs
totalled approximately \10.6 billion or 9.1 per cent of GDP in
2001 (Chart 4). The net loan outstanding to GDP ratio was 21
per cent in 1995. Provisional data for end-2002 suggest this ratio
has fallen to 5.5 per cent.
In recent times businesses have sourced an increasing share of
new loans from resident MFIs. In 1995 the gross loans
outstanding from resident MFIs to GDP ratio was 24.1 per cent.
The corresponding ratio for non-resident MFIs was 34.0 per cent.
By 2002 these positions had reversed somewhat. The gross
position for corporates vis-a `-vis resident MFIs was 35.6 per cent
by comparison with 27.0 per cent for non-resident MFIs (Charts
5 and 6). The comparison between resident and non-resident
MFIs is more significant on a net basis. The data for 2001 suggest
that corporates were net lenders to non-resident MFIs (i.e.,
deposits exceed loans).
6 By comparison the net loans
outstanding to GDP ratio with resident MFIs was 13.0 per cent
of GDP.
6 It is not always intuitive why corporates would simultaneously hold substantial loans and
deposits. However, there are a number of possible explanations. Foremost among these
observations is that aggregate figures offer no insight to the fact that a fraction of companies
may hold substantial loans while another group of different companies may hold substantial
deposits. This has been the case for large and small companies respectively in the UK (see
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Chart 6: Total Corporate
Borrowing from Non-Resident
MFIs
Source: BIS and CBFSAI Calculations.

























Chart 7: Absolute Number of
Liquidations Initiated
(a)
Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment.
(a) Total includes members voluntary liquidations, 
creditors voluntary liquidations and  court-ordered  
liquidations.
(b) Non-resident MFIs do not conduct business 
through a branch or subsidiary physically located in 
Ireland.
The maturity profile of debt is an important consideration when
analysing the financial burden associated with higher
indebtedness. Firms can lower their principal repayments (i.e.,
their current debt service burden) by lengthening the repayment
period of the debt. Conversely, an adverse income shock can be
substantially more damaging to any firm if a large share of the
outstanding principal has to be repaid within a short period of
time. There is some evidence that the maturity profile of Irish
firms’ bank loans has lengthened in recent years (Table 1).
Table 1: Maturity Profile of Corporate Bank Loans
% share of loans due to be repaid:
Year Within 1 year Between 1 and 5 years More than 5 years
1999 41.6 23.8 34.6
2000 43.0 23.8 33.2
2001 41.8 26.0 32.2
2002 36.1 29.3 34.6
Note: Data are available for bank debt sourced from resident MFIs only and are compiled
from internal sources.
3. The Level of Corporate Liquidations in
Ireland
Observing the number of corporate liquidations is important
because of the importance of the financial health of non-financial
firms for other agents in the economy. There can be a myriad
of channels through which non-financial corporates interact with
other corporates, households and financial institutions. It isQuarterly Bulletin Summer 2003
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through these channels that the financial distress caused by
business liquidations can be transferred to the banking system
directly through the bank-firm relationship or indirectly via other
agents’ relationships with the firm and their banks. Liquidations
can be grouped into two categories; those liquidations where
there are no outstanding bad debts because the proceeds of the
liquidation are sufficient to repay any outstanding debts and the
remaining liquidations where the proceeds from the liquidation
process are insufficient to repay all outstanding debts. We label
this latter category ‘‘insolvent liquidations’’.
7
Insolvent liquidations could directly increase the probability of
financial difficulties among banks by forcing the banks to write-
off the liquidated firms’ outstanding debt.
8 These write-offs
reduce the profitability of the banks. These write-offs can also be
more damaging to the bank if the bad debt is unanticipated and
no provisions out of past profits have been made to cover the
losses. During 2002 approximately 0.75 per cent of private-
sector credit outstanding from all credit institutions was non-
performing.
9 Provisions made by the credit institutions covered
these non-performing assets quite comfortably. The credit
institutions made provision for 0.96 per cent of outstanding
private-sector credit to be non-performing. Write-offs above this
latter level would, therefore, have been unexpected.
Insolvent liquidations could also increase the probability of
financial distress in other associated firms and households. In
similar fashion to banks, these firms may be forced to write-off
outstanding credit to the company. Also, Bernanke and Campbell
(1988) suggest that potentially insolvent liquidations can cause
liquidity crises in other firms and/or households in two ways.
First, a succession of bankruptcies can make all lenders in the
economy more nervous. This can lead to a general tightening of
7 There are three types of liquidations: members voluntary liquidations (MVLs), creditors’
voluntary liquidations (CVLs) and court-ordered liquidations (COs). The distinction is
between MVLs and the other categories. A necessary condition for an MVL is a declaration
of solvency. A majority of the directors must agree that the company can pay its debts in
full within one year of the liquidation. There is no such declaration of solvency in the
remaining two types of liquidations. Thus, we use the label ‘‘insolvent liquidations’’ as a
summary term to describe CVLs and COs.
8 Interestingly, the banks themselves through their own actions may be partly responsible for
causing these unanticipated bad debts. ‘‘Boom and bust’’ models of banking crises suggest
a pivotal role for the indebtedness of non-financial firms in explaining one type of banking
crisis. Logan (2000) suggests that this model describes best the last UK banking crisis where
25 banks failed in the early 1990s. The background to this model is a period of
macroeconomic boom and bust. The demand for credit rises as economic growth
accelerates. Banks are happy to lend against collateral based on increasing asset values.
Honohan (1997) describes the banks as suffering from ‘‘disaster myopia’’. The banks over
lend to projects with poor long-term prospects in an effort to compete in a booming
economy with an increasing number of borrowers and lenders. But banks will have
underestimated their credit risk if they have mistakenly overestimated the quality of their
assets and/or the value of the collateral. Banks are vulnerable to a sharp deterioration in
the health of borrowers especially if the values of the assets used as collateral are also
falling. Both the financial health of borrowers (i.e., profitability) and asset values are likely
to decline with falling economic growth rates.
9 This total for non-performing loans includes loans from the household sector as well.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2003
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the availability and/or cost of credit across the economy. This
may hurt other firms who require additional financing to
compensate for falling levels of internal finance (i.e., income).
Second, the legal proceedings of bankruptcy freezes the assets
of failing firms. This renders assets due to the short-term creditors
illiquid and may worsen the creditors’ liquidity situation. The
employees will face a corresponding liquidity crisis, albeit
probably temporary, arising from their unemployed status.
These write-offs and liquidity crises are first round effects on firms
and households that were stakeholders in the liquidated firms.
However, we can also highlight the possibility of second-round
effects where these stakeholders adjust to their worsened
financial situation and cut back on their discretionary
expenditures. For example, financial accelerator models of
economic growth highlight the importance of firms’ spending
decisions on access to finance and the current financial health of
firms. These injured firms might cut investment (which will impact
on the health of capital-goods firms) and cut dividends and wages
(which reduces the income of households and other
shareholders) (see, for example, Fazzari et al., 1988; Bond and
Meghir, 1994; Bernanke et al, 1996; Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999;
Benito and Young, 2001). These cutbacks in discretionary
expenditures could reduce economic growth and may start

























Chart 8: Liquidation Rate
(a)(b)(c)
Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment and CBSAI Calculations.
(a) Liquidations rate is the number of liquidations 
divided by the number of companies on the live 
register in the previous year.
(b) Insolvent liquidations rate includes creditors 
voluntary and court-ordered liquidations.
(c) Dashed lines are average rates between 1975 
and 2001.
Court Creditors Members
Chart 9: Types of Liquidation
Initiated
(a)
Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment and CBFSAI Calculations.
(a) Members is members voluntary liquidation, 































02 99 96 93 90 87 84 81 78 1975Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2003
99
The number of all liquidations has risen almost continuously since
1975 and totalled 1,132 in 2002 (Chart 7).
10 We can identify two
time periods during which the number of liquidations fell for
more than one year: 1976 to 1979 and 1993 to 1997. One
obvious explanation for the rise in liquidations since 1975 is the
rising number of businesses over this period. The annual
liquidations rate is the share of all registered companies
liquidated during each year. The corporate liquidations rate has
trended upwards again in recent years (since 1997) after a
decade during which time the annual rate almost halved (Chart
8).
11 The liquidations rate in 1997 (0.41 per cent) was the lowest
rate recorded for seventeen years since 1980. In 2002, 0.77 per
cent of registered companies were liquidated, a rate of
liquidation above the historical annual average of 0.62 per cent
over the period 1975 to 2001.
As noted earlier, some liquidated firms have outstanding debts
at the end of the liquidation process (i.e., insolvent liquidations).
These debts have to be written-off by the firm’s stakeholders. In
this way these liquidated firms impose financial pressure onto
other agents (e.g., trade creditors, banks, shareholders and
employees). The broad aggregate liquidation rate may overstate
the scale of this financial pressure because the rate is calculated
including firms that are wound up but have no outstanding debts.
The share of liquidated firms with outstanding unpaid debts
fluctuates over time; on average 55 per cent over the period
1975 to 2001 but fluctuating between a minimum recorded
share of 20 per cent in 1976 and a maximum share of 76 per
cent in 1987 (Chart 9). We can calculate a narrower aggregate
liquidation rate for liquidated companies unable to pay all
outstanding debts. Approximately 0.35 per cent of registered
companies were liquidated with outstanding debts per annum
over the period 1975 to 2001 (Chart 8). This narrower liquidation
rate was 0.28 per cent in 2002 and below its long-run average.
This narrower liquidation rate continued to fall after 1997 when
the broader liquidation rate began to rise. The narrower rate
reached a twenty-year low in 1999 (0.21 per cent).
The exact financial cost to credit institutions and other firms and
households of liquidated firms with outstanding debts is
unknown. This is because the magnitude of the outstanding
10 This total will include the liquidation of both indigenous and foreign-owned companies.
Any company that is incorporated outside the State and establishes a branch in the State
must register with the Companies Registration Office and also register any subsequent
liquidation.
11 Part of the explanation for the rising liquidation rate is a decline in the total number of
registered companies by comparison with the 1998 total. The interpretation of this series
should be treated with some caution as (i) the register of companies is essentially a real-
time database and determining the number of active companies at a historic point in time
is not straightforward and (ii) the number of registered companies could be affected by
periodic administrative initiatives to ‘‘clean-up’’ the list of registered companies or to restore
companies to the register. These initiatives could significantly alter the number of registered
companies between any two years.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2003
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debts from liquidated companies is unknown and the distribution
of the debts across credit institutions, other firms and households
is also unknown.
4. The Role of Indebtedness in the Probability
of Liquidation
The following theoretical model of the probability of bankruptcy
was suggested initially by Wadhwani (1986) to explain a
relationship between inflation and the liquidation rate.
12 This
model also suggests a positive relationship between
indebtedness and the probability of bankruptcy (Davis, 1987;
Vleighe, 2001).
13 Increasing indebtedness results in a higher ratio
of interest payments to income thereby reducing the safety
margin for firms if interest rates rise, income falls or the market
value of the firm declines in value (Davis, 1987).
Vleighe (2001) documented a stylised version of the Wadhwani
(1986) model. A firm is assumed to be bankrupt when its current
operating losses (π ) are large enough to cancel the residual
equity value of the firm (E).
π+ E < 0 (1)
The equity value of the firm is the residual of the total market
value of the firm (MV) after the value of outstanding debt (D) has
been deducted. This bankruptcy condition tightens as the ratio
of debt to the total value of the firm increases
π+ MV − D < 0 (2)
A key assumption behind this bankruptcy condition is the ability
of firms to borrow a value equal to the full market value of the
firm. For a variety of reasons firms may not be able to borrow
against the full value of the firm (i.e., the firms are credit-
constrained).
14
12 These models were designed to explain the role of indebtedness in the probability of
bankruptcy. We have retained the original term ‘‘bankruptcy’’ in explaining the models and,
therefore, we are assuming implicitly that a firm will be liquidated when it is bankrupt.
13 Any theoretical models that relate indebtedness to the probability of survival of individual
firms contradict the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem. The MM theorem illustrates how
capital structure (i.e., the ratio of debt to equity) should be irrelevant to the value of a firm
under certain restrictive conditions. Two of these conditions are the ability of corporates
to borrow unlimited amounts of debt at market interest rates and there is no bankruptcy.
14 There is a huge literature on capital market imperfections dating back to Modigliani and
Miller (1958). Much of this literature considers possible market imperfections, such as
information asymmetries, moral hazard and adverse selection, that may affect both the
quantity and price of debt finance provided to companies. See, in particular, Jensen and
Meckling (1976), Leland and Pyle (1977), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Myers and Majluf
(1984) for the classic references.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2003
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The bankruptcy condition for a firm that cannot access more
debt in the future becomes
π+ K < 0 (3)
where K is the liquidation value of the firm’s assets.
Current profitability can be decomposed into its constituent
parts: sales revenue and costs.
π= pY − wL − qM − rD (4)
where p is the price per unit of output, Y is total output, w is the
wage rate, L is total employment, q is the input price, M is the
volume of non-labour inputs (i.e., raw materials) and r is the
nominal interest rate.
Exploring equations (2) and (4) highlights the two channels
through which increasing indebtedness increases the likelihood
of bankruptcy. In the first instance, increasing indebtedness
reduces the residual equity value in the firm. In essence, the value
of additional debt that the firm can acquire is diminished as the
ratio of debt to market value increases.
15 This occurs because
either the firm has borrowed the total residual equity value
already or the firm is credit-constrained before borrowing an
amount equal to the full residual equity value of the firm. Second,
increasing indebtedness reduces current operating profits (or
increases current operating losses) through increasing interest
payments.
A comparison of the recent trends of both corporate
indebtedness and insolvent liquidations suggests that a link
between increasing indebtedness and an increasing rate of
insolvent liquidations is not apparent in the Irish case. However,
there are two noteworthy qualifications to this analysis. First, the
unavailability of a pre-1995 time series of corporate indebtedness
does not allow us to compare the liquidation rate with the
changing level of corporate indebtedness earlier than the mid-
1990s. For example, we do not have sufficient data to determine
whether there is any lagged effect of indebtedness on the rate
of insolvent liquidations. Second, this is a very partial analysis.
There are additional factors which determine the aggregate
liquidation rate and which may be obscuring the link between
indebtedness and liquidations.
15 It is possible that market value increases with increasing indebtedness. If the firm is
borrowing to invest in projects with expected positive net worth, then the current market
value of the firm might increase also to reflect this expected increase in future profits. This
may slow the rate of any increase in the debt to market value ratio as the firm borrows
additional funds.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2003
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5. Additional Factors Determining the Rate of
Corporate Liquidations
The level of indebtedness, the level of operating profits and the
level of interest rates are just some of a number of factors
determining the rate of corporate liquidations in an economy
and which have been highlighted by previous authors
(Wadhwani, 1986; Davis, 1987; Vleighe, 2001). These other
factors include the birth rate of new companies, the value of
non-residential property and changes in the legal alternatives to
liquidation. We consider in more detail below how each of these
factors might affect the rate of corporate liquidations.
(A) Birth Rate of New Companies
An increasing birth rate of new companies is expected to
increase the rate of corporate liquidations. The birth rate of new
companies is measured as the ratio of new company registrations
to the total number of companies ‘‘alive’’ on the companies
register. This variable captures either a higher propensity of new
firms to exit within a very short period of time or the increased
likelihood that new firms will grow to displace incumbent firms
and these incumbents will subsequently cease trading. It is
through either of these two channels that an increasing birth rate
is believed to increase the liquidation rate. Chart 10 confirms that
the birth rate of new companies has fluctuated over the past
three decades. The decline in the birth rate in the very recent
past may suggest that the influence of new firms on the
corporate liquidation rate may not be as significant either
currently or in the near future.
(B) The Value of Non-Residential Property
Firms often use property as collateral for loans. Falling property
values reduces the value of collateral against which firms can
secure additional borrowing. Falling property values may suggest
that firms are more vulnerable to any adverse income shock
because their ability to borrow additional funds against the value
of this property, to compensate for the falling income, will have
fallen also. The data in Chart 11 show that the value of
commercial property, measured by a commercial property
capital values index, has risen significantly in recent years but has
levelled off in 2002.
(C) Legal Alternatives to Liquidation
There may be a legal alternative to liquidation, such as the
examinership process, which might be an important factor when
studying the rate of corporate liquidations across time. In the
Irish case, the 1990 Companies (Amendment) Act and the 1999
Companies (Amendment No.2) Act might be important in this
respect. The 1990 Act introduced the examinership process and
allowed potentially viable companies to be saved from
liquidation. The Act potentially reduced the liquidation rate.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2003
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Under the 1990 Act a company had to have ‘‘some prospect’’
of survival to qualify for examinership. The 1999 Act tightened
the conditions under which companies qualified to enter the
examinership process and thereby potentially increased the
liquidation rate. This qualifying criteria was tightened so that the






















Chart 10: Corporate Birth
Rates(a)
Source: Department of Enterprise, Trade and 
Employment and CBFSAI Calculations.
(a) Calculated as the ratio of new companies 
admitted to live register to the total number of 



















Chart 11: Capital Values of JLLS
Commercial Property Index
Source: Jones Lang LaSalle.
(a) Average values of index in each year.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Private-sector indebtedness, measured as the debt to income
level, has grown in recent years and is now at a historically high
level. Our analysis shows that corporate debt to income levels
have risen in recent years and that the rate of corporate
liquidations has begun to rise recently after several years during
which the rate halved. However, the share of insolvent
liquidations, where corporates have not declared their ability to
repay all outstanding debts from the proceeds of the liquidation
process, remain at a low level by historical comparison.
Observing the number of corporate liquidations is important
because of the importance of the financial health of non-financial
firms for other agents in the economy. Insolvent liquidations in
sufficiently high numbers can be a cause of financial instability
by forcing banks to write-off bad debts. These liquidations can
transmit also financial distress to other corporates (similarly
through bad debts) and households (by making household
members unemployed).
16 See the Companies Registration Office at www.cro.ie for more details.Quarterly Bulletin Summer 2003
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Previous authors have concluded that indebtedness is an
important determinant of the rate of liquidations among
companies (Wadhwani, 1986; Davis, 1987; Vleighe, 2001). It is
in this context that Irish firms might appear to be more vulnerable
now to an adverse shock to their income as the data show that
the corporate debt to income level, albeit based on a short-time
series of data, has risen in recent years. A higher level of
indebtedness increases the probability of bankruptcy in two
ways; namely, through lower profits because of the burden of
interest repayments and a reduced ability to borrow further funds
to see them through temporary cash flow difficulties. Our
analysis suggests, albeit with some noteworthy qualifications, that
a link between the recent increase in corporate indebtedness
feeding through to a higher rate of insolvent liquidations is not
apparent.
The level of indebtedness, the level of operating profits and the
level of interest rates are just some of a number of factors
determining the rate of corporate liquidations in an economy
and which have been highlighted by previous authors
(Wadhwani, 1986; Davis, 1987; Vleighe, 2001). The other factors
in explaining the corporate liquidation rate, in addition to
indebtedness, are the birth rate of new companies, the value
of non-residential property and changes in legislation governing
alternatives to the liquidation process. All of these variables, in
similar fashion to the level of indebtedness, have changed
significantly in Ireland over recent years.
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